

Final report of the project:

# WHY DO MIGRANTS LEAVE THEIR COUNTRIES?

Motivations to migrate at the point  
of departure:

## The case of Egypt

(May 2002-November 2003)

Co-ordinator: Dr Leila Simona Talani

Members of research group:

Dr Stefan Wolff  
Dr Kirstin Henrard  
Dr Eiko Thielemann

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Simona

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## **Preface: The Project, the Survey and the Report**

This report presents and elaborates on the results of the survey carried out by the research group on motivations for migration at the point of departure. The survey has been conducted during the period between April and May 2003 in Cairo with the support of the International Organization for Migration and included 103 interviews to Egyptians willing to migrate abroad. The interviews took place in the Emigration and Egyptian Aboard Sector of the Ministry of Manpower and Emigration and have been processed in SPSS. The text of the questionnaire and the descriptive statistical tables are contained in the appendix 1 and 2 of the report. The project is a pilot project financed by the British Academy.

The main objective of this research project is to identify the causes of migratory flows at the point of departure with particular attention to the dynamics of migratory flows from the Middle East and Northern African (MENA) countries to EU. The project has two goals:

1. to understand the broad dimensions of the problem of migration, both legal and illegal, in the context of the theories of globalisation and regionalisation; and
2. to define the socio-political and economic contexts in which the decision to migrate mature, with the aim to find appropriate responses to the issues of migration primarily at the point of departure.

The research is therefore focusing on the following questions:

How is the process of globalisation related to the increase of migratory flows from less developed countries to western ones?

What are the main political, economic and social causes and consequences of migration from the point of view of departure countries? Which are the sources of illegal migration?

Is there a tension between legal and illegal migration?

Who wins and who loses in both the departure and destination countries from the increase of migratory flows, particularly illegal ones?

What are the dynamics of the smuggling of migrants between the MENA area and the EU?

This report presents the results of the research inserting them in the theoretical debate about migration and assessing them from the legal, the political and the economic perspectives. In the introduction, the theoretical context of the research is summarised specifying the main concerns and points of reference of the analysis. The first chapter proposes an historical overview of the dynamics of Egyptian migration

and define the profile of the Egyptian migrant. The second chapter deals with theories related to the push and pull factors of migration and applies them to the choice of destination countries as emerges from the survey. In the third chapter the notion of the “fortress Europe” is analysed from the legal point of view, focusing, in particular, on the migratory policies of the most important destination countries for Egyptian migration to Europe. The fourth chapter reflects upon the political context of Egyptian migration, while the fifth one refers on its economic characteristics. The conclusions address the issue of the relevance of the evidence so far collected for the validation of the theoretical approach adopted by the project.

Both the questionnaire and the report are published in the Web site of the Egyptian Ministry for Man Power and migration (<http://www.emigration.gov.eg/publications/Publication.asp>).

# **Introduction: Theoretical background**

By Leila Simona Talani

The theoretical background of the project is represented by the traditional qualitative definition of globalization (see Hirst and Thompson 1999; Mittleman 2000; Sassen 1998; Weiner 1995), identifying the process of globalisation as a qualitatively new phenomenon, characterised by the dramatic increase of foreign direct investment (FDI), the transnationalisation of social groups, including labour and business, and by an unprecedented interdependence of financial markets (Overbeek 2000).

The components included in such a qualitative definition of globalisation are represented by technological transformation; financial transformation; the geographical reallocation of production; the process of commodification; the polarization of wealth; the subordination of politics to economics and the related decline of the nation-state; and the emergence of a new global division of labour (see Overbeek 2000).

Technological change represents the engine of a process of transformation, which interests both the productive and the financial structure. Leaving aside the latter, what is particularly relevant to frame the analysis of migratory flows, is the geographical reallocation of production. This takes place through the creation of Export Processing Zones in developing countries, through a policy of Mergers and Acquisitions or through straightforward Foreign Direct Investment.<sup>1</sup>

As a consequence of the restructuring of production, also the labour structure changes with a substantial reallocation of labour intensive production in third world countries. However, this outcome is compounded by the opposite effects of technological development in terms of the increase of distant work, and of the increase of labour mobility, including mass migration.

Indeed, on the one hand, production tends to move to some specialised regions of the globe<sup>2</sup>, where it is possible to exploit the advantages of lower production costs both in the form of lower labour costs and/or in the form of lower costs of primary resources. This phenomenon gives rise to the paradox of regionalization within globalisation characterized by the

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<sup>1</sup> Dicken, P., (2003), *Global shift : reshaping the global economic map in the 21st century*, Sage Publs

<sup>2</sup> Scholars refer to the "triad" to indicate the three main zones of production of the globe, i.e.: Asian pacific region, America and Europe.

creation of economically integrated regions<sup>3</sup>. This further adds to the marginalisation of those zones of the globe, which are not interested, for reasons too long to analyse here, by the process of geographical displacement of production nor by the globalisation of financial markets.

On the other hand, however, the populations of those marginalized zones of the globe, whose economic conditions are deemed to worsen as a consequence of the process of globalisation, experience an increased incentive to leave their home countries and move to the more developed regions of the world looking for better standards of life.

This produces the two interrelated phenomena of the “brain drain”, when skilled or highly educated labour flees the country of origins, and “mass migration”, when migratory flows interest unskilled labour.

The ensemble of the above described dynamics leads to a new global division of labour whose main characteristics are, thus, on the one hand, the geographical displacement of production alongside regional patterns and the increased use of third world cheaper labour; and, on the other hand, the increase of brain drain and mass migration from the regions left behind by the process of regionalization within globalisation.

One of the outcomes of this new division of labour is an overall decrease of production costs both in third world countries and in industrialized ones. Indeed, this process not only brings about lower production costs through the reallocation of production abroad or the hiring of immigrants, particularly illegal ones, but it also lowers the prices of domestic labour by putting pressure on organized labour and reducing its bargaining power.

Moreover, mass migration, both legal and illegal, acquires regional patterns, due to historical, geographic, social or cultural reasons. All responses to mass migration, therefore, take the form of regional policies, like the US or the EU immigration policy. Here a fundamental paradox arises. The paradox is between the advantages of immigration in terms of reduction of the costs of production and of contribution to the sustainability of the welfare state (particularly given the aging problem in the more developed world) and the implementation of stricter migration policies at the regional level. In Europe, for example, despite the fact that the implementation of a common migratory policy is still far to be achieved, the outlook of public policy responses to mass migration has accredited the idea of the creation of the so-called “Fortress Europe”, i.e., an area where internal mobility is promoted while barriers are erected vis-à-vis countries outside the EU<sup>4</sup>.

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<sup>3</sup> See, for example Breslin, S., Hughes C.W., Philis, N., and Rosamond, B., (2002), *New regionalisms in the Global Political Economy*, London: Routledge, Hettne, B., Inotai, A., Sunkel, O., (1999), *Globalism and the new regionalism*, MacMillan Press I.t.d

<sup>4</sup> Though the Amsterdam Treaty moved migratory issues from the third (intergovernmental decision making) to the first pillar (Community law), there is still no common migratory policy

Of course the main reasons for the adoption of similar responses to mass migration are the traditional concerns over political unrest, social conflict, cultural clashes, or religious struggles.

However, a further aspect of the issue is represented by the political economy consequences of "illegal" migration (as opposed to the legal one), in terms of cost reduction and increase of bargaining power vis-à-vis organized labour. There seems indeed to be some evidence of the fact that the use of illegal migrant work reduces the wages of legal work and consequently, the power of organised labour. For example, in Germany studies have shown that a 1% increase in the share of less-skilled foreign workers in the labour force leads to a 5.9% fall in the wages of blue collar workers and in a 3.5% increase in white collar wages<sup>5</sup>. In this context, it would be interesting to carry out further investigation on the economic sectors involved in the use and exploitation of illegal immigration and to assess the political economy consequences of similar practices in terms of shift of power between different socio-economic actors<sup>6</sup>.

Finally, analysing the dichotomy between legal immigration and illegal immigration, the second is more favourable to the neo-liberal order than the first, because it allows for the flexibilization of the internal labour market, while legal immigrants should be integrated in the existing welfare state provisions system.

Summing up, the political economy consequences of the increase of mass migration in the context of globalisation are: a precarization of working conditions both in developed and in less developed countries; an increase of the power of the transnational companies at the international level and the reaction of the governments through the constitution of regional governance scheme, such as the EU, where the labour/capital dynamics are reproduced but with a strong reduction of power on the labour side<sup>7</sup>.

Concluding from this theoretical perspective, the following issues appear particularly relevant as a background to the research project::

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and the member states retain full competence on legislating on migration. The alien model of immigration regime based on soft law is still the one prevailing at the European level. There have been some moves to devise a common policy to combat illegal immigration (see European Council in Tampere, 1999 and European Council in Seville, 2002) but still no concrete measures have been taken.

<sup>5</sup> See Overbeek, H., (2000), *Globalisation, Sovereignty and transnational regulation: reshaping the governance of international migration*, in Bimal Gosh, ed., (2000), *Managing migration: time for a new international regime*, Oxford: Oxford University Press).

<sup>6</sup> For some data see: Gosh, B, (1999), *Challenges and opportunities of economic globalisation: some implications for labour, industry and nation states*, paper prepared for the Bundesanstalt für Arbeit workshop on "Internationalisierung der Arbeitsmärkte", 27-28 April, Frankfurt a/M. See also Harris, N., (1995) *The new untouchables. Immigration and the new world worker*, London: Penguin books

<sup>7</sup> See for example the relations ETUC-European Round Table or UNICE at the European level.

1. The paradox of marginalization within globalisation and its causes and consequences for the working force of marginalized countries
2. The paradox of regionalization within globalisation and the related definition of a new global division of labour
3. The paradox of the fortress Europe and the consequences of illegal migration.

# Ch.1: Egyptian migration to Europe: A general overview

By Leila Simona Talani

## *Patterns of Egyptian migration*

“Egyptians have a reputation of preferring their own soil. Few leave except to study or travel<sup>1</sup>; and they always return...Egyptians do not emigrate<sup>8</sup>”.

This was the case until very recently and only a reduced number of Egyptians, primarily professionals, had left the country in search for employment before 1974.

Scholars<sup>9</sup> identify three phases in the evolution of the Egyptian migratory flows, the common thread being a marked prevalence of migration within the Arab world. Coexisting political, demographic and economic pressures led to the first wave of international migration in post-revolutionary Egypt, which, however, interested only a very limited number of students and professionals. During the 1960s, international migration thus took various forms including permanent, temporary, legal and illegal, but was always very restricted in scale and scope.

With the advent of the '70s, Egyptian emigration changed in nature, size and destination. More Egyptians left their homeland and headed towards the rich oil-producing states, first after the 1973 boom in oil prices and again after the second increase in oil prices in 1979.

However, it was only in the second half of the '80s that Egyptian migration became a relevant phenomenon, entering its last phase of development. By the end of the '80s Saudi Arabia was a favoured destination for Egyptian migrants because of the high competition faced by unskilled Egyptians at home from Asian and Yemeni workers. Other Gulf States (Kuwait and the UAE) later became favoured destinations for the unskilled groups. Peak demand for contract labour occurred in 1985, with an increase of 255% over 1984. This was a turning point in the evolution of contract labour. By 1990 the number of contracts was double the number in 1981, indicating that despite fluctuations on a yearly level during the second half of the '80s, demand for Egyptian labour continued. The three distinct phases of Egyptian emigration may be summarised as follows:

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<sup>8</sup> See IOM, (2003), *Contemporary Egyptian Migration*, IOM: Cairo

<sup>9</sup> See Appleyard, R., (ed) (1999), *Emigration Dynamics in Developing countries, Volume IV: The Arab Region*, London: Ashgate

**Table 1 Egyptian migratory phases**

<b>Phase</b>	<b>Period</b>	<b>Labour category</b>	<b>Profession</b>	<b>Destination</b>
<b>I</b>	1965-1975	Skilled/unskilled	Teaching/construction	GCC/Lybia
<b>II</b>	1975-1985	Unskilled rural	Agriculture/construction	Jordan/Saudi/Iraq
<b>III</b>	1985-1995	Skilled/unskilled	Scientists/agriculture	Saudi

Source: Appleyard, R., (ed) (1999), *Emigration Dynamics in Developing countries*, Volume IV: The Arab Region, London: Ashgate

Nowadays, according to the national estimates, the total number of Egyptians abroad is about 2.7 million. They comprise about four percent of the total population of Egypt, and about 1.5 percent of the total migrants all over the world (total number of migrants all over the world is estimated to be about 175 million). Two-third of the Egyptian migration is temporary, while the other third is permanent. Temporary migration is mainly labour migration to oil-rich Arab countries. Saudi Arabia absorbs about 50 percent of the Egyptian temporary migration. Permanent migration is mainly to USA, Canada, Australia, and Western European countries. USA is the first destination of permanent migration from Egypt. Egyptian migrants to USA comprise about 40 percent of the total Egyptian permanent migration<sup>10</sup>.


**Table 2 Estimated Number of Permanent Egyptian Migrants by Country of Destination-Year 2000**

<b>Country of destination</b>	<b>Number in thousands</b>	<b>Percentage (%)</b>
USA	318	38.6
Canada	110	13.3
Italy	90	10.9
Australia	70	8.5
Greece	60	7.3
Holland	40	4.9
France	36	4.4
England	35	4.2
Germany	25	3.0
Switzerland	14	1.7
Austria	14	1.7
Spain	12	1.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>824</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: CAPMAS

<sup>10</sup> See Egyptian Ministry for manpower, Migration section, web-site:

**Graph. 1 Estimated Number of Permanent Egyptian Migrants by Country of Destination-Year 2000**



Source: CAPMAS

Also European countries (EU countries plus Switzerland), however, host, overall, around 40% of Egyptian permanent migrants, which makes Egyptian migration to the EU a very relevant phenomenon.

The results of the survey confirm that most of the migrants going to western European countries (55.5%) and almost all those who go to the US and Australia (93%) are permanent migrants. On the contrary, the whole sample of those going to Arab countries (100%) intends to go back to Egypt.

The European country experiencing the highest inflow of Egyptian migration is Italy. According to Egyptian official data reported above, in the year 2000, 10.9% of permanent Egyptian migrants were living in Italy, which means around 90,000 people. However the OECD reports a stock of only 32,8 thousands residence permits held by Egyptians in Italy for the year 2000. This discrepancy between the Egyptian and the OECD figures on the number of permanent Egyptian migrants in Italy points to the possibility of the existence of a high number (around 60,000) of undocumented Egyptian permanent migrants, though, of course there is no official data on this subject. This is clearly related to the very strict migratory policy enforced by the Italian Government, which makes it extremely difficult to obtain a residence permit or a work permit<sup>11</sup>.

In terms of trends, the number of residence permits held by Egyptian in Italy has increased substantially in the last decade, from 7 thousand in 1985 to 32.8 thousand in the year 2000<sup>12</sup>.

**Table 3. ITALY, stock of foreign population by nationality**

Thousands

	1985	1990	1995	2000
Morocco	2.6	78.0	94.2	159.6
Albania	..	..	34.7	142.1
Romania	..	7.5	24.5	68.9
Philippines	7.6	34.3	43.4	65.4
China	1.6	18.7	21.5	60.1
United States	51.1	58.1	60.6	47.4
Tunisia	4.4	41.2	40.5	45.7
Fed. Rep. of Yugoslavia	13.9	29.8	56.1	40.0
Senegal	0.3	25.1	24.0	39.0
Germany	37.2	41.6	39.4	37.3
Sri Lanka	2.5	11.5	20.3	33.7
<b>Egypt</b>	<b>7.0</b>	<b>19.8</b>	<b>21.9</b>	<b>32.8</b>
Poland	..	17.0	22.0	31.4
India	5.3	11.3	14.6	30.3
Peru		5.4	10.0	29.9
Other countries	289.5	381.9	463.7	524.6
<b>Total</b>	<b>423.0</b>	<b>781.1</b>	<b>991.4</b>	<b>1 388.2</b>
<i>Of which: EU</i>	..	148.6	164.0	151.8

*Note:* Data are from residence permits and refer to the population on the 31 December of the years

indicated. For details on definitions and sources, refer to the notes at the end of the Annex.

Figures for 2000 include 116 253 regularised persons.

Source, OECD

<sup>11</sup> See Chapter 3 of this Report

<sup>12</sup> See OECD, International Migration statistics

<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/46/2956579.xls>

The second country of destination in Europe for Egyptian migrants is Greece, with 60 thousands estimated permanent migrants according to the CAPMAS figures. This is followed by Holland (40,000), France (36,000), England (35,000) and Germany (25,000). A more limited number of Egyptians reside in Switzerland, Austria and Spain.

The survey carried out by the research groups confirms that the majority of Egyptian migrants prefer Arab destinations, as we will see in the following chapter of this Report.

### *The profile of the Egyptian Migrant*

Egyptian migration has always proved a selective phenomenon in which migrants are not a random sample of the population of origin. Egyptian migrants are a selected group in terms of age, sex and educational status. They are predominantly concentrated in young age groups, with more males than females, and with a relatively high educational status, especially among those from an urban background<sup>13</sup>. This section sheds some light on the characteristics of Egyptian migrants in general and as emerged from the survey.

The 1987 CAPMAS<sup>14</sup> survey indicated that Egyptian migrants were almost exclusively males (97.7% of current migrants). The age group was in 89.8% of cases between 20 and 44 years old. In 63.5% of cases, emigrants were married.

The results of the survey carried out by the research group largely confirm the profile of the Egyptian migrant outlined above.


The majority of perspective migrants interviewed in the Migration section of the Egyptian Ministry of manpower were, indeed, males (71.8%), though the percentage of females (28.2%) was by far above the figures reported by the CAPMAS in 1987 (2.4%). (See Graph.2)

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<sup>13</sup> For more information see Eurostat working paper, (2000), Push and Pull factors of international migration. Country Report: Egypt, Population and social conditions 3/2000/E/n.7


<sup>14</sup> See CAPMAS, (1987).

**Graph. 2: The survey: Gender characteristics of Egyptian migrants**



As in the official figures, the biggest majority of migrants was composed by young people between 20 and 50 years of age (86.4%). (See graph 3)


**Graph. 3: The survey: Age composition of Egyptian migrants**



The figures relating to the marital status are perfectly coincident with the official ones indicated by the Egyptian statistical office in 1987. Indeed,


63.1% of Egyptian migrants interviewed were married (63.5% in the CAPMAS data). (See Graph.4)

**Graph. 4: The survey: Marital status of Egyptian migrants**



Moreover, the survey shows that 80.6% of interviewed migrants do possess some form of education, with 69.9% of the sample having at least secondary education. These figures are much higher than the ones reported by the official statistics, according to which only 41% of migrants have education at the secondary level and above.


**Graph. 5: The survey: Level of education of Egyptian migrants**



Finally, the sample includes potential migrants from all parts of Egypt, though the survey was conducted in Cairo. As reported in the graph

below, 35% of the sample was born in greater Cairo, 40.8% in Upper Egypt and 24.2% in Lower Egypt.

**Graph. 6: The survey: Birth place of Egyptian migrants**



Concluding, with respect to the official sources on the profile of the average Egyptian migrant, the sample analysed by this survey is over representing both the female component and the level of education. Whether this result is related to an effective change in the migrant profile, to include more educated people and more women, is indeed not possible to infer from such a limited number of questionnaires.

## **Ch. 2** Egyptian migration to Europe: Destinations

By Eiko Thielemann

Although still an under-theorised area of study, one can identify a number of prominent theories and models that try to explain the destination choices of migrants (Kritz et al. 1992, Massey et al. 1993, Meyers 2000). The idea of pull factors is commonly used to explain the patterns of migrant choices regarding different possible destination countries. A review of the theoretical literature on migration, produces five categories of pull-factors—economic, historic, policy related, political and geographic—which will be introduced in turn.

### *Economic Factors*

Economic theories of migration are based on the idea of 'utility maximisation' in which migrants face financial and other constraints which will influence their choice of destination country. This literature suggests that cross-country income differentials in particular will have an influence on such choices. Neo-classical economic migration theory (Ranis and Fei, 1961; Harris and Todaro 1970, Todaro 1969) explains the decision to migrate as one of income maximisation in which wealth differentials and differences in employment opportunities constitute important pull factors. International migration is expected to be determined by geographic differences in the supply and demand of labour. Ultimately, in this view, it is wage differentials which can explain movements from low-wage countries to high-wage countries. In its micro-economic extension (Sjaastad, 1962; Borjas 1990), rational actors (be it individuals or larger units such as families or households) decide to migrate in the expectation of a positive, often monetary, net return from migration. In this framework, the decisive factor is income differentials as well as the probability of employment in the destination country. In other words migration decisions can be seen as being guided by processes of income maximisation and risk minimisation.

### *Historical Ties, Networks & Path Dependency*

Historical ties between countries of origin and destination countries often lead to transport, trade and communication links which tend to facilitate movements of people from one country to the other. Material links are often accompanied by ideological or cultural links. Colonial legacies often explain why administrative and educational systems in third world countries mirror those of a past colonial power and often continue to be reflected in migration flows long after independence (Fassmann and Muenz 1992). Language ties, communication links and cultural networks that are responsible for the diffusion of particular consumption patterns, contribute to channelling international migration to particular destination countries (Massey et al., 1993: 446-7).

Moreover, the fact that migrant communities have been established in certain destination countries as a result of historic ties, will often lead to the growth of migrant networks that may foster future migration flows. Such networks are sets of interpersonal ties between earlier migrants already resident in a destination country and potential migrants in countries of origin that are based on family ties, friendships or shared community origin. Such ties can significantly reduce the costs and risks of migration, thus channelling migration flows in the direction of earlier migration flows. By passing on information about access to a particular country and its employment opportunities, they constitute a form of social capital (Hugo, 1981). Once migration connections have been established, the presence of relatives, friends, and/or others from the same community of origin may form a strong incentive to choose a particular destination. Migration may thus be seen as a self-sustaining diffusion process (Massey et al. 1993).

Following the same line of reasoning we could also expect a certain degree of path-dependency from one period of migration to the next. Such a process is likely to be the result of two dynamics. First, there will be a reduction of costs and risks for migrants as they can rely on the support of personal networks. Second, there will be certain persistence of existing migration routes and patterns, as agents and traffickers will have incurred sunk costs (Pierson 2000) by investing in the creation of networks which they will be reluctant to give up.

### *Immigration Policy*

Destination countries have in general jealously guarded the sovereignty they possess over their territorial borders and have used a number of measures to influence the access of third country nationals to their territory and polity (Thielemann 2003a). With regard to 'access to territory' measures, one can identify rules and procedures governing the admission of foreign nationals and its instruments include visa policy, low- and high skilled migrant programmes, regulations for carriers, safe third country provisions, etc. With regard to 'access to polity' or integration measures, one can point to policies concerned with rights and benefits given to immigrants once they have arrived in a country of destination that regulate migrants' integration into the society of the destination country. These include rules about access to the labour market, welfare provisions and naturalisation provisions. Policy-makers can introduce changes in the regulations in these two areas in an attempt to influence the relative 'openness' or 'restrictiveness' of their immigration regime over time.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> Due to limitation of space, other possible explanations relating to the political reputation of destination countries and their geographic location will not be dealt with in detail. However, it is reasonable to assume that Concerns about migrants' likely acceptance into a new host society can be expected to be important considerations for potential migrants. The reputation of a country in terms of its 'liberal credentials' as well as its track record on issues such as adherence to human rights standards, international humanitarian crises, community relations, reception and

The various above explanations of pull-factors for migrants are obviously not mutually exclusive. On their own, as well as in combination, they can be expected to help explain why migrants are more attracted by some destination countries than others. Individuals might engage in cost-benefit calculations that make them choose richer countries with more employment opportunities over poorer ones with fewer work opportunities; they might try to reduce risks and costs by using existing networks; that might prefer a more liberal country of destination over a less liberal one; they might be more likely to end up in a country that is relatively closer to their country of origin; and finally their decision might be affected by the relative openness or restrictiveness of the immigration regime operating in different countries of destination.

When one looks at the empirical evidence provided by the survey conducted by this project, a first preliminary (and of course at this stage only indicative) test of the first three of the above hypotheses is possible. Table 1 splits the results of the survey results in two parts, looking at two sets of relatively comparable countries of destination of Egyptian migrants, Western OECD countries and Arab Gulf states, respectively. It contains the results of the survey regarding the question Egyptians' most preferred countries of destination. The table also provides three indicators for economic, historical and policy related pull-factors. The economic indicator is the unemployment rate which contains information on the general level of employment opportunities in a country of destination. To represent historical pull factors, Table 1 provides the size of foreign (or foreign-born) population in a country of destination relative to that country's total population. A high number here can be seen as an indicator for past inflows of migrants and the existence of migrant communities that can act as facilitating networks for 'would be migrants'. Finally, the table provides the net migration rate for the different destination countries, which can be seen as a proxy for the relative openness or restrictiveness of a destination country's immigration policy.<sup>16</sup>

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integration of foreigners, naturalisation policies and the like, can be expected to play a role in a migrant's consideration about the relative attractiveness of countries of destination. Moreover, with regard to geography, we can expect ease of access, in particular geographic proximity, between a country of origin and a country of destination can also be expected to be a pull factor in migration patterns. Despite technological developments which have made geographic distance less of an issue than it was in the past, most migrants' resources are limited and smaller distances will often mean lower costs of transport and hence easier access. In other words, geographic distance can often be regarded as a proxy for the costs of movement. Although other factors, such as length and relative openness of countries' territorial borders, will also play a role as to how accessible a country of destination is for (particularly irregular) migrants, geographic distance can be expected to constitute an important consideration.

<sup>16</sup> The net migration rate constitutes the difference between the number of persons entering and leaving a country during the year per 1,000 persons (based on midyear population). An excess of persons entering the country is referred to as net immigration (e.g., 3.56 migrants/1,000 population); an excess of persons leaving the country as net emigration (e.g., -9.26 migrants/1,000 population).

Keeping in mind the limitations of the data available at this point, their analysis provided in Table 1 nonetheless allows us to make a number of observations. First it shows that more than two thirds of respondents listed an Arab country as their preferred country of destination. This was the case notwithstanding the fact that average unemployment rate of the Arab countries listed was three times higher than that of the Western countries. The reason for the popularity of Arab countries appears to have more to do with historical migration legacies than generally more open immigration policies (Kuwait being the one notable exception).<sup>17</sup> Second, one sees that among Western countries, the US and the UK were the most preferred countries. In the case of Arab destination countries, the three most popular countries by far were Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait. Third, when comparing stated preferences regarding individual countries of destinations and the three indicators provided, we find support for the economic, historical and policy-related hypotheses developed above. And we do so for both Western and Arab destination countries. As expected, unemployment rates are negatively correlated with destination choice, i.e. countries with lower unemployment tend to be more popular destination countries. We also find the expected positive correlation between the stock of foreign (born) population and the popularity of destination countries. In other words, the larger the number of foreign (born) residents (and thus by extrapolation Egyptians) among the population of a country of destination, the more likely it is that migration networks can be expected to exist which will tend to make that country a more popular destination country. We also find a strong positive correlation between the popularity of a destination countries and the relative openness of their immigration regime. The greater the net migration rate, i.e. the easier it is for migrants to immigrate to a particular destination country, the more popular that country will tend to be.

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<sup>17</sup> In order to substantiate this further, one would of course need to identify how many Egyptians there among the large stock of foreigners the Arab states, as one would expect ties with Egyptian relative and friends rather than foreigners in general to act as the determinant for the choice of destination country.

Table 4 Destination countries: motivations for choice

Rank	Country	Stated 'preferred destination country'	Country	Unempl oyment Rate (2001)	Country	Stock foreign population of population in 1999	ofCountry (born) (% total population in 1999)	Net Migration Rate (2002)	Rank
Western Countries									
1	USA	11	Netherla nds	3.3	Australia	23.6	Australia	4.05	1
2	UK	11	USA	4.8	USA	10.3	USA	3.52	2
3	Netherlands	4	UK	5.5	France	5.6	Netherlands	2.35	3
4	Australia	3	Australia	6.6	Netherlands	4.1	UK	2.2	4
5	France	2	France	8.8	UK	3.8	Italy	2.07	5
6	Italy	1	Italy	9.5	Italy	2.2	France	0.66	6
<i>Total/Average</i>		32		6.4		8.2		2.47	
<b>Correlation Coefficient</b>		<b>1.00</b>		<b>-0.88</b>		<b>0.85</b>		<b>0.93</b>	
Arab Countries:									
1	KSA	30	UAE	2.3	UAE	64	Kuwait	14.04	1
2	UAE	19	Quatar	2.7	Kuwait	59.2	KSA	1.23	2
3	Kuwait	13	Kuwait	7	Bahrain	35.2	UAE	1.22	3
4	Oman	3	Bahrain	15	KSA	23.1	Bahrain	1.07	4
5	Bahrain	3	Lebanon	18	Oman	20.6	Oman	0.29	5
6	Jordan	2	KSA	25	Jordan	NA	Lebanon	0	6
7	Lebanon	1	Jordan	25	Lebanon	NA	Jordan	NA	7
8	Quatar	1	Oman	NA	Quatar	NA	Quatar	NA	8
<i>Total/Average</i>		72		18		26.3		0.64	
<b>Correlation Coefficient</b>		<b>1.00</b>		<b>-0.89</b>		<b>0.96</b>		<b>0.83</b>	

Sources: Own survey results, International Labour Organisation, *Yearbook of Labour Statistics 2002*; *CIA World Factbook 2003*.



These results, and in particular the strength of economic and historical network variables, are supported by other results produced by the survey. When asked about the principal reason for their preference for a particular destination country (see Table 2), more than three quarters of the respondents either stated general job opportunities or a specific job offer. Family ties, although less frequently mentioned still came out as an important reason for destination choice. The relative importance of such ties is further supported by the survey results to the question about the principal sources of information on their preferred country of destination (see Table 3). Here, more than two thirds of all respondents regarded information provided by friends and relatives as the most important source on which they based their choice of preferred country of destination.

**Table 5 Survey results: What is the principal reason for your preference destination country?**

	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percent</b>
<b>General job opportunities</b>	66	64.1
<b>Family ties</b>	16	15.5
<b>A specific job offer</b>	13	12.6
<b>Haj</b>	2	1.9
<b>Language</b>	1	1.0
<b>Beauty of country</b>	1	1.0
<b>Company Husband/Wife near to Egypt</b>	1	1.0
<b>Scientific Development</b>	1	1.0
<b>Study</b>	1	1.0
<b>Total</b>	103	100.0

**Table 6 Survey results: What have been your sources of information on your preferred country of destination?**

	<b>Friends /Relatives</b>	<b>Egyptian Authorities</b>	<b>Embassies</b>	<b>Internet</b>	<b>General Literature</b>	<b>Tot</b>
<b>Count</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>99</b>
<b>Percentage</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>100</b>

Overall, the results from our survey regarding the preferred destination countries for Egyptian 'would be migrants' appear to support a number of key findings of other recent projects in related research areas (Schoorl et al. 2000; Robinson et al. 2002; Thielemann 2003b). With more data becoming available, better estimates on the relative strength of the factors explored above and the comparative analysis of the Egyptian data will be possible. This will allow us to gain even deeper insights into the question of migrant destination choices.

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## **Ch. 3** Egyptian Migration to Europe: The Legal Context

By Dr Kristin Henrard

### *Introduction*

As outlined by official data Egyptian migration to Europe is mainly of a permanent kind and the main countries of destinations in the EU are, in the following order: Italy, Greece, Holland, France and England. The results of the survey confirm that the main destination countries in Europe for Egyptians are the UK, Holland, France and Italy, but in a reversed order. This chapter will focus on the legal context of Egyptian migration in Italy and England, which are the main countries of destination respectively according to the official data and according to our research.

When studying the legal context of Egyptian migration to Europe, one should first have regard to the relevant rules developed at the level of the European Union, more specifically within the first pillar of the European Communities (Title IV TEC). Indeed, the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam has transferred the competence concerning migration from the third (rather intergovernmental) to the first (supranational) pillar, leading the way for EC secondary legislation in the domain. Consequently, the remaining migration related competences of the member states should be exercised with due regard for the framework developed at EU level.

It should be acknowledged that a special protocol arranges the participation of the UK (as Ireland and Denmark) with regard to title IV TEC. The UK chose to opt out totally with a possibility for a selective opt-in (Boccardi 2002, 147). While it is not yet clear to what extent the UK will opt-in the various immigration initiatives, the EU framework is in any event binding for the other member states, including Italy, France and the Netherlands (the other destination countries in the data).

This part on the EU framework will be followed by a succinct analysis of the relevant standards of the UK and Italy.

Because, as will be developed infra, the EC standards in the field of immigration have not been developed to any meaningful extent, most attention will go to the British and Italian rules as regards the more concrete questions about the existence of quota for Egyptians, criteria for work permits and their renewal, family reunification etc.

In any event, both the EU level as the national levels reveal the paradox, that was already hinted at in the introduction of this report, between on

the one hand the fortress Europe mentality<sup>18</sup> of restricting immigration possibilities and on the other hand the actual shortages on the labor market in Europe, partially due to population decline. Even though there is a growing acknowledgement that because of 'competition for the highly skilled in a globalised economy and accelerating demographic ageing, immigration is taking on a new profile in the EU'<sup>19</sup>, the actual policies that have been and are being developed arguably do not fully reflect the necessary implications.

### *EU standards pertaining to migration: the framework*

The Amsterdam treaty of 1997 introduced a new title in the EC Treaty entitled 'visas, asylum, immigration and other policies related to free movement of persons' which implied a shift from the third pillar to the first pillar for that matter. It can however be said that this shift merely implied a cautious communitarisation, not in the least because during the first five years the decisions at the level of the Council needed to be made by unanimity (art 67 EC Treaty). While article 63,3 of the EC Treaty stipulates that the Council shall adopt 'measures on immigration policy within the following areas: conditions of entry and residence, and standards on procedures for the issue by Member States of long term visas and residence permits, including those for the purpose of family reunion, illegal immigration and illegal residence, including repatriation of illegal residents', it has been argued that this specification and 'the level of competence accorded to the EU in migration matters do not live up to the statement of the intent to introduce a comprehensive and coherent immigration policy' (Apap 2002, 312). Consequently, 'despite the significant progress that the Treaty of Amsterdam represents for the European Union, it is only the beginning of a move towards a genuine immigration policy' (ibid.).

The Commission has so far issued several communications related to the development of the Community immigration policy, including the proposal for a directive dealing with conditions of entry and residence of third country nationals for the purpose of paid employment and self-employed economic activities (11 July 2001). Importantly, the Commission explicitly states that the zero immigration policies of the past thirty years are no longer appropriate in the current economic and demographic context of the EU and of the countries of origin, and argues for a new approach to immigration, which would make channels for legal

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<sup>18</sup> For an analysis putting the fortress Europe image into perspective see A. Geddes, 'International Migration and State Sovereignty in an Integrating Europe', *International Migration* 2001 vol 39(6), 34-37.

<sup>19</sup> Commission for the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the EP, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, on immigration, integration and employment, COM (2003) 336 final, 9.

migration available, especially for labor migrants. While the Commission does not follow the call for a policy of replacement migration, proposed by the March 2000 report of the UN (UN Secretariat, ESA/P/WP.160), it does underline the need to have a proactive immigration policy, more specifically a policy which would try to control immigration according to the needs of the European labor market, instead of attempting to create a Fortress Europe aimed at stopping immigration (Apap 2002, 315).

To this end the Commission has inter alia the following principles in mind (Apap 2002, 316):

- the granting of a work permit should be simple, rational, flexible, on the basis of verifiable and objective criteria, delivered within a short time and the procedure should be transparent
- applicants should preferably have an employment contract or a recruiting promise but this should NOT be an obligation
- member states should have the possibility of establishing quotas responding to their specific needs

However, when considering the actual progress that has been made concerning the various legislative proposals of the Commission, two things are obvious. Firstly, it is a very slow process indeed, revealing the sensitivities and the related sovereignty concerns of the member states, and secondly, the on-going negotiation rounds reveal a tendency to weaken, water down the standards (also Niessen 2001, 419).<sup>20</sup>

Regarding the proposed directive on migration for employment and self-employment, 'all of the core labour market conditions for admission for employment and the possible exceptions to them...were controversial, ... revealing a general unwillingness... to change current national law and practice in any way' (Peers 2003, 137). In other words, the member states want so much flexibility that little or no common rules (at European level) would be left.

Similarly, the proposed directive on family reunion has been seriously watered down so far. Not only are EU citizens' family members excluded, but the directive will also only apply where the applicant has 'reasonable prospects of obtaining the right of permanent residence'. Furthermore, the core rules on the family members who can join have been weakened tremendously, the standards on conditions for entry have been lowered

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<sup>20</sup> It will be interesting to note what the influence could be of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, once it gets a stronger legal status as anticipated by the Convention preparing ICG 2004. Indeed, an ambitious reading of the Charter reveals that if legally binding it 'would create or expand rights protection in certain important fields, particularly for migrants. In particular, this would be relevant as regards access to employment, equality in working conditions, ... access to remedies and fair trial' (Peers 2001, 166).

significantly, and the grounds for refusing or withdrawing a permit have been dramatically expanded (Peers 2003, 126-130).<sup>21</sup>

In any event, as the initiatives developed at EC level are not intended to establish a uniform immigration policy (see also article 63, second sub §. EC Treaty), it will remain important to consider the relevant national legislation (even after the conclusion of the directives in process).

### *UK standards pertaining to migration*

The relevant pieces of legislation are the Immigration Act of 1971, the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 and the Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.

The starting point seems to be that in principle a leave to remain in the UK is temporary. Indeed, only after four years of continuous leave to remain in the UK, an application for indefinite leave to remain can be made.

While the completion of an immigration application form is compulsory for most applications to stay in the UK, this is not the case for these applications for limited leave to remain for employment requiring a work permit.

Since August 2003 there are 8 different forms for immigration applications, each covering a different situation/group of persons. Here the distinction should be underlined between the Highly Skilled Migrant Program (HSMP) – for which there is a separate immigration application form – and the work permit scheme. The UK is indeed one of the countries that developed a package to attract specialized labor.

While the foundation of the UK immigration law continues to be the Immigration act of 1971, the work permit regime is not covered by the statute. The work permit scheme can only be accessed by an application by an employer, who has to demonstrate that he has attempted but failed to fill the position from the UK and the EEA labor markets. Furthermore the proposed employee must meet a designated skills level and the post must be sufficiently senior.

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<sup>21</sup> Regarding the directive on family reunification, compare with Boeles 2001, 61-71. Finally, there has also been some weakening of the standards set out in the directive on the status of long term resident third country nationals, which is anticipated to further go down as some member states have reservations about the basic principles of the directive on equality and free movement (Peers 2003, 133-135).

Since 28 January 2002 a HSMP program has been put into place. Recent changes to this scheme came into effect 31 October 2003 and attempt to make the UK an even more attractive destination for the highly skilled.

The main distinguishing feature with the work permit regime is that here individuals can be granted a permit in their own right without the need for there to be a supporting employer, provided that certain criteria are met. Their leave will be for one year in the first instance, and can be extended by a further three years providing the criteria are still met (see *infra*).

Originally, one needed to score 75 points or more by meeting three of the four following criteria in order to qualify for a full HSMP permit:

1. hold a phd or equivalent qualification;
2. have five years recent graduate experience, 2 years of which should be at senior level;
3. have been earning at least 64 000 euro in the previous year;
4. be able to demonstrate a significant achievement in their field.

However the recent (2003) changes reduce the overall points required to qualify. These changes furthermore introduce new criteria for applicants aged under 28, to make it easier for younger, skilled applicants to work in the UK, and they take account of the achievements of skilled partners of HSMP applicants (for further reference, consult the section on work permits at [www.ind.homeoffice.gov.uk](http://www.ind.homeoffice.gov.uk)).

There are special forms to apply for an extension of stay as a Highly Skilled Migrant (FLR (HSM)). Similar forms should be used to apply for extensions of stay in the UK for certain categories of employees (au pair, teacher or language assistant under an approved scheme, domestic worker in a private household, member of operational ground staff of an overseas owned airline etc.).

One can apply for indefinite leave to remain in the UK with form SET (O) after having completed four years of continuous leave to remain in the UK as work permit holder, as highly skilled migrant, or as most of the employees covered by form FLR (O).

At the level of the work permit scheme, dependents of the work permit holders are entitled to remain in the UK during the period for which the permit is valid, provided that they can be supported without recourse to public funds (Apap 2002, 320)

For family members of non work permit holders, there are three different immigration application forms:

While Form FLR (M) is meant to apply for an extension of stay in the UK as the spouse or unmarried partner of a person present and settled in

the UK, form SET (m) should be used by these persons for an indefinite leave to remain in the UK. I would like to point out that it seems possible to apply for indefinite leave to remain without the strict requirement of four years of continuous leave to remain in the UK which applies to work permit holders and HSM.

For other family members (but spouse or unmarried partner) of a person present and settled in the UK form SET (F) can be used to apply for indefinite leave to remain in the UK. The family members that are covered by this arrangement are: a child under 18 of a parent, parents or relative present and settled in the UK; the adopted child under 18 of a parent or parents present in the UK and finally, the parent, grandparent or other dependent relative of a person present and settled in the UK.

### *Italian standards pertaining to migration*

The most relevant acts are:

- Law no 40 of 1998 with the Consolidated Text of Provisions relating to Immigration and the status of foreigners<sup>22</sup>
- the most recent and controversial Bossi-Fini Amendment of 2002<sup>23</sup>

Italy seems a prime example of a country exhibiting the paradox regarding its approach to immigration: on the one hand it is clear that there are plenty of jobs available in Italy (labor shortage due to low birth rate and several jobs that Italians do not even want to accept), while on the other hand the country demonstrates an increasingly restrictive attitude towards immigration. The latter can be explained in terms of racist and anti-immigrant sentiment but might also be related to the existence of an extensive underground economy (Apap 2002b, 141; Di Pascale 2002, 71). Arguably the sudden rise of immigrants, especially since the 80s, can be explained because of Italy's economic revitalization, while there was an initial lack of appropriate legislation (the first specific immigration act only coming about in 1986).

The Bossi-Fini maintained the quota system of the previous act, which implies that every year the government establishes a quota of immigrants who can be admitted into the country. This decision is based on the necessities of the labor market and employers. Under the pre-Boss-Fini regime an immigrant could legally enter Italy to search for work if he had a sponsor (an employer who hires and vouches for him). Under Bossi Fini an immigrant can only enter Italy legally if he has a job already in place upon arrival.

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<sup>22</sup> For a good analysis of this law see Di Pascale 2002, 71-77.

<sup>23</sup> For a deconstruction of Bossi Fini in terms of a human rights critique, see Totah 2003, 13-16.

Upon entry one receives a 'contract to stay'. The term of this contract (article 4 Bossi Fini) is not longer than nine months for seasonal labor (non renewable), no longer than 24 months for self-employment (renewable); no longer than 12 months for short-term subordinate labor and 24 months for long term subordinate labor (renewable).

Another restrictive element is that under Bossi Fini the employer now has to provide an apartment for the foreigner and must pay for any expenses needed for the worker to travel back to his country after the contract expires.

Only an immigrant who has a work contract will be given a two-year residence permit. From the moment one is fired, one is liable to be repatriated. Under Bossi Fini one can only obtain a residence card, allowing permanent residence in Italy, after 6 years of legal residence (article 9), while this was possible after 5 years in terms of the previous act.

In the case of Italy there does not seem to be a special program to attract highly skilled labor.

Also the family -reunification rules have become more stringent under Bossi Fini (articles 23 and 33). Under the previous law an immigrant with residence permit or stay card could bring his children, parents, and other family members including siblings into Italy and have them established as residents. In terms of Bossi Fini, family reunification can only be requested by an immigrant who has legally resided in Italy for more than one year. Furthermore the group of family members is now restricted to spouses, children under age of 18, disabled sons and daughters and the parents (in certain restrictive conditions).

### *Conclusion*

While there is a general recognition of the positive effects of immigration, not in the least to deal with problems of labor shortage, European states remain reluctant to agree to a genuine European immigration policy (recognizing Europe as an immigration area). The fear of uncontrollable migration arguably leads to the desire to hold on to the image of fortress Europe, while sovereignty concerns further explain the desire to keep the European norms on an absolute minimum level so that the ultimate immigration policy is still largely determined by national decisions (Apap 2002b, 15).

At the national level states generally seem to adopt further restrictive legislation concerning immigration, while developing simultaneously packages to attract specialized labor (e.g. UK).

## **Ch. 4** Egyptian Migration to Europe: The Political Dimension

By Stefan Wolff

### *Introduction*

According to its 1971 constitution, Egypt defines itself as a social democracy and a republic. Its predominant ethnic groups are Egyptian, Bedouin Arab and Nubian. Ninety percent of the population of 68 million are Sunni Muslim, with the next largest religions being Coptic Christians and Jews. In addition, there are a number of smaller religious minorities, none of which are officially recognised as religions. The country's official language is Arabic, but English and French are also widely spoken.

The current political regime has been shaped to a large extent by President Husni Mubarak who succeeded President Sadat in 1981 after the latter had been assassinated by Islamic radicals. Since 1981, emergency laws have been in force, frequently used by the government to limit constitutionally guaranteed civil liberties and political rights.

While international observers generally judge the country to be relatively stable and the rule of the dominant political party in the country, the National Democratic Party (NDP), to be safe, Egypt has seen an increasing number of protests, riots and anti-government demonstrations over the past several years. These have been partly the reason for, as well as a result of, an ambitious political and economic reform programme introduced by the ruling NDP.

### *Egypt's Political System*

The Egyptian political system is geared towards a strong executive with authority is vested in the president, who is nominated by parliament and then appointed following a popular referendum. The president can appoint one or more vice presidents (none has existed since 1981), a prime minister, and a cabinet. The president's term runs for 6 years, and the office's current incumbent, Mubarak, has already been re-elected three times, his current term running out in 2005.

The legislature is bicameral. The lower house, the People's Assembly, has 454 members—444 popularly elected and 10 appointed by the president. The assembly has a 5-year term, but can, in principle, be dissolved at any stage by the President, for which a referendum is needed. The upper house, the Advisory Council or Majlis al-Shura has a merely consultative function. Of its 264 members, 88 are appointed and 174 elected for 6-year terms.

Egypt is a highly centralised state. Regional governors and mayors are appointed by the central government and act as its representatives outside the capital. However, there are also local councils, which are popularly elected.

With power concentrated in the office of the president and with the People's Assembly dominated by the NDP (currently 388 of its members are affiliated with the NDP), the sixteen legally recognised "opposition" parties in Egypt play only a minor role in day-to-day politics. However, they act as important voices of dissenting views and have their own independent media, which to some extent even receive government funding, while on the other hand significant restrictions on the political process and freedom of expression for non-governmental organizations remain. The Muslim Brotherhood, founded in Egypt in 1928 and banned in 1954, remains an illegal organization and cannot be recognized as a political party as Egyptian law prohibits the formation of political parties based on religion. The government, however, has displayed a degree of tolerance towards its members during the first two terms of President Mubarak's tenure, but has since then changed to a policy of more active repression and harassment of its members, who are nevertheless able to contend seats successfully in elections for the People's Assembly and local councils, albeit as independents.

The judicial system in Egypt is primarily based on the French model. While it would go too far to attest Egypt to have a properly functioning system of the rule of law in place, the courts have increased their independence from the government and the ruling party.

#### *Human Rights Situation*

The summary verdict of the US State Department on the human rights situation in Egypt in 2003 was that the "Government generally respected the human rights of its citizens in some areas; however, the Government's record remained poor with respect to freedom of association, the improper use of State Security Emergency Courts and military courts, and torture, among other areas. The President and the entrenched NDP dominated the political scene to such an extent that citizens did not have a meaningful ability to change their Government." The main problem areas identified in the 2003 Country Report on Human Rights Practices were the use of the emergency law for the restriction of civil liberties, workers' rights, the use of torture, and discrimination against religious minorities. There have also been a number of credible reports on discrimination and abuse of women and gays.

#### *Implications for Research Project*

The fact that political issues remain a very sensitive topic in Egypt and that there are potentially severe repercussions for political non-

compliance had been a concern for the research team from the beginning. Nevertheless, we initially had a larger set of questions related to push-factors on which we hoped to obtain information from potential migrants, including some on political motivations to emigrate. This, so our rationale, would have helped us to provide a more detailed and subtle analysis of people's reasons to leave their home country, which, in turn, may have enabled us to make more specific policy recommendations to the EU and member states' governments on how to develop proactive policies on limiting immigration by devising strategies that eliminate, or minimize, a wide range of push factors, including, potentially, those of a political nature.

The original set of questions looked as follows:

Why did you decide to emigrate (multiple answers possible)?

- (1) economic reasons (e.g., lack of employment, lack of well-paid employment)
- (2) environmental reasons (e.g., lack of water)
- (3) discrimination (e.g., on political, religious, ethnic grounds)
- (4) verbal or physical threats to yourself and/or your family
- (5) other, please specify:

Was there any special event or development that prompted your decision? Yes/No If Yes, please specify

Would you consider returning? Yes/No


If yes, under what conditions (multiple answers possible)?

- (1) reasons to emigrate disappeared (e.g., regime change, economic boom)
- (2) reasons to emigrate no longer significant (e.g., earned enough money to live self-sufficiently, start own business)
- (3) hopes connected to emigration did not materialize
- (4) other, please specify

However, it was not possible to include questions in our survey that would have explicitly suggested any reasons other than economic ones. So it is impossible to determine whether political reasons play a major role in people's decision to migrate. The only way to infer a certain degree of "political" motivation would be to point to the disproportionate share of Christians among migrants. Indeed, as it is shown in the figure below, the survey shows that Christians compose more than 30% of our sample of potential migrants. Interestingly enough, official by CAPMAS or EUROSTAT do not give any indications on the religious characteristic of the average Egyptian migrant. It might be possible to assume that the higher motivation of Christians to migrate is, at least partly, based in the levels of discrimination they experience which has been documented in reports on the human rights situation in Egypt. However, the data

available to us at the moment do not provide conclusive evidence for that.

**Graph. 7 The survey: Religion of potential migrants**



One task for future research in this area, therefore, is to devise a range of more subtle questions that would allow a better analysis of the presence of political push factors and to triangulate quantitative survey data with confidential, anonymous interviews of survey participants in which it may be possible to discuss political issues as well and the degree to which they affected the decision to migrate. It should also be noted that, given the general economic situation in Egypt today, it would not at all be surprising to find that economic factors indeed are the overwhelming push factors and that more political aspects play at best a marginal role. However, a final judgement on this issue needs to be reserved for a later stage of the research project.

#### *Sources*

US State Department, Egypt Country Report on Human Rights Practices, 2003

CIA World Fact Book, 2003

Ben Townley, "Persecution Continues in Egypt", Gay.com UK, 25 September, 2003

The Economist, Country Profile Egypt, 2003

International Crisis Group, The Challenge of Political Reform: Egypt after the Iraq War, Brussels 2003

## Ch.5: Egyptian migration to Europe: The economic background

By Leila Simona Talani

### *The situation of the Egyptian Economy*

Since the 1990s the shift to a free market economy and the adoption of macroeconomic policy reforms and structural adjustments in Egypt has produced mixed results. Stabilisation programs have been successful and a series of IMF agreements along with massive external debt relief, particularly from the US through US Aid, helped Egypt improve its macroeconomic performance during the 1990s. Also the fiscal balance, the level of foreign reserves and the size of the external debt improved in the course of the '90s. However, by mid-1998 the momentum of the reform was lost and, together with a reduction in the inflow of foreign currency, this led to a devaluation of the Egyptian pound which still, in the year 2003, has not stopped (In June 2003 1USD=5.97LE; in November 2003 1BP=10.2EGP).

Though the country has undergone a substantial programme of privatisation and has displayed the strongest commitment to economic reform and structural adjustment, the total amount of foreign direct investments of companies registered with the General Authority for Investment and Free Zones was only around 30 billion EGP in 2002 (3 billion BP).

Indeed Egypt's economy relies mainly on tourism, remittances from Egyptians living abroad, revenues from the Suez Canal, oil and foreign development aid. UNDP data in 2003 suggest that almost 50% of Egypt's GDP in the year 2000 was generated by the services sector, with tourism as the most important voice, employing around 2.2 million people. The events of September the 11<sup>th</sup> and its aftermath severely affected this important economic sector of the country leaving it in an even more difficult situation. As a result, Egypt's real economic growth has declined from an average of approximately 5% to 2.1% per annum. This growth rate is not enough to absorb Egypt's growing labour force.

**Table 7: Remittances in Egypt**

Year	Remittances (millions of \$)	Number of migrants (millions)
1990	3,748	2.20
1996	3,107	2.90
2001	2,876	2.70


Source: IOM

### *The economic motivations of Egyptian migration*

Given this economic climate, it is not surprising that the results of the survey show that Egyptian migration is mainly based on economic reasons.

Specifically asked about the motivations to migrate, the respondents to the questionnaire answered in 66% of cases that the reasons prompting them to leave their country were mainly economic.

**Graph. 8 The survey: Why do you go abroad?**




Of course, a big difference can be noticed by disaggregating the data by gender. Indeed, economic motivations represent the main reason for male migration in 73% of cases, while for female migration it was only 48% of cases, whereas family unification represented the main motivation for female migration in 14% of cases and 0% of male migration.

It seems also important to note that while 64% of the overall sample claims that they chose a specific destination countries for general job opportunities, only 12.6% of Egyptian migrants have a specific job offer, let alone a contract. Considering that in many EU member states having a job contract is a necessary precondition to being admitted legally in the hosting country (See Chapter 3), it might be possible to speculate on the lack of proper documents by Egyptian migrants.


It is true that, when asked about whether it was possible to enter a destination country without appropriate documents 93.2% of the respondents answered no, but obviously no different answer could have been expected and, yet, almost 7 of the respondents were not aware of the necessity to hold appropriate entry documents.

**Graph. 9 The survey: Can you go abroad without the required papers ?**




Further adding to the conclusion that the majority of potential migrants have an economic interest to move abroad is the fact that, asked about their expectations from migration, around 74% of the sample answered that they would like to earn a good income as opposed to increase their expertise and skills.

**Graph. 10: The survey: What do you expect from the experience of working abroad?**



In terms of the insertion into the labour market of the receiving countries, potential migrants expected to be working first and foremostly in the services sector (56%) with 40% wanting to be involved in general services, 9% in tourism and restaurants, and 7% in home services. Only 14% were willing to work in industry and even less (3%) in agriculture.

**Graph. 11 In which of these fields can you work abroad ?**



Tough there are no data available on the insertion of Egyptian migrants in the European labour markets, pointing to the necessity of more research in this field, a comparison may be effected between their expectations and the reality of their integration in the labour markets of the Arab countries.

The data collected by the Egyptian Ministry of manpower and Emigration<sup>24</sup> show that in the year 2002, 33.8% of Egyptian migrants were working in industry, while according to our survey only 14.7% were willing to be employed in the industrial sector. The agricultural sector was absorbing 8.6% of the Egyptian migrant labour force, against a 4.4% of people expecting to do so; and finally the services sector was employing only 12.7% of those migrating to the Arab states, whereas at least 41% would have liked to be integrated into the services sector. The existence of a discrepancy between the expectations and the actual integration of migrants in the labour markets might point to the existence of a mismatch between the demand and the supply of migrants labour and to a less than efficient utilisation of the resources.

<sup>24</sup> See IOM, (2003), Egyptian Migration 2003, Cairo: IOM

## **Conclusions:**

Egypt is increasingly becoming a source of permanent migration to the EU. This is in contrast with a long tradition of stability of Egyptians as well as a more recent tendency to migrate mainly within the regional borders of the Arab world (the MENA area). Though the numbers relating to Egyptian Migration to Europe are not especially worrying, other groups of migrants, like Turks, Albanians or Moroccans being by far more relevant, this trend does not seem likely to be revertible.

The roots of these new developments have to be traced back in the new position of Egypt in the global economy. The country, once integrated in a thriving regional bloc, with the crisis of the latter (for reasons too long to mention here), is now finding itself more and more marginalized from the new global dynamics, and less and less integrated in it. The consequence is an increase in brain drain and mass migration to more developed countries.

Both these phenomena have been tackled by this report making reference to the results of a survey conducted in the field by the members of the research group. The survey has helped defining the profile of the Egyptian migrant, his/her expectations, his/her motivations to leave his/her country and its preferred pattern of migration.

Clearly many questions still remain open to be able to draw any relevant academic or policy-oriented conclusions. These refer, for example, to the dynamics of migration, the kind of documents used to cross the Mediterranean, the role of organised crime, the insertion in the economy of the receiving country and their likelihood to be involved into the thriving underground economy of some of the European States, like Italy and Greece, where Egyptian migration is more numerous.

All these questions, however, might only be tackled by further research.



Second : data about the country of destination

8- To which of this country would you like to migrate ?

Countries of West Europe :                      Mention the name of the country

Arab Countries :                                      Mention the name of the country

Other :    Mention the name of the country

9- What are the main reasons that make you want to migrate ?

Family ties    Job opportunities

Language    Simplicity of communications

A specific job offer                                  Other reasons

10- What is your source of information about country of destination ?

Friends / Relatives                                  Internet

Egyptian Authorities                                General readings

Embassies    Other reasons ( Sources )

11- How do you want to travel to the country of destination ?

Sea ( Steam Ship )                                  Land ( Cars or buses )

Air ( Planes )

Third : Data on motivations of migration

12- Why do you go abroad ? ( you can choose more than one answer )

Economical reasons ( Unemployment – low salaries )

Environmental reasons ( Crowd – pollution )

Other reasons

13- Was there a specific incident that affected your decision ?    Yes

No

If yes please specify :

14- In case of travelling abroad do you intend to come back after a specified period ?

Yes    No

If yes, under any circumstances ( you can choose more than one answer )

Absence of migration reason ( For example Improvement of the economic status in Egypt )

Achievement of the migration's aims ( For example Having the enough amount of money to make your own commercial project in your country )

Failed to achieve what you migrated for

Other

Fourth : Data on working abroad

15- Did you work before abroad ? Yes No

16- Can you go abroad without the required papers ? Yes No

17- What do you expect from the experience of working abroad ?  
Adding to your experience and talents  
Good income

18- In which of these fields can you work abroad ?

Agriculture

Industry

Independent work

Home services

Building and Constructions

Tourism and restaurants

Other services

I don't know

Other

19- Did anybody help you to find a job ? Yes No

If yes , who helped you to find a job ? ( You can choose more than one answer )

Relatives : In country of destination

In Egypt

Egyptian friends : In country of destination

In Egypt

People that you don't know In country of destination

In Egypt

Competent authorities

**Appendix 2:** Tables on the results of the survey

**Frequencies**

**Statistics**

		Sex	Age	BPLACE	MARRIAGE	EDUCATIO	RELEGION	OCCUPATI
N	Valid	103	103	103	103	103	103	102
	Missing	0	0	0	0	0	0	1

**Frequency Table**

**Sex**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Male	74	71.8	71.8	71.8
	Female	29	28.2	28.2	100.0
	Total	103	100.0	100.0	

**Age**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Less than 20	10	9.7	9.7	9.7
	20-30	37	35.9	35.9	45.6
	30-40	38	36.9	36.9	82.5
	40-50	14	13.6	13.6	96.1
	50+	4	3.9	3.9	100.0
	Total	103	100.0	100.0	

**BPLACE**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Greater Cairo	36	35.0	35.0	35.0
	Lower Egypt	25	24.3	24.3	59.2
	Upper Egypt	42	40.8	40.8	100.0
	Total	103	100.0	100.0	

**MARRIAGE**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Married	65	63.1	63.1	63.1
	Single	38	36.9	36.9	100.0
	Total	103	100.0	100.0	

**EDUCATIO**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1	20	19.4	19.4	19.4
	2	11	10.7	10.7	30.1
	3	23	22.3	22.3	52.4
	4	37	35.9	35.9	88.3
	5	12	11.7	11.7	100.0
	Total	103	100.0	100.0	


**RELEGIION**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1	72	69.9	69.9	69.9
	2	31	30.1	30.1	100.0
	Total	103	100.0	100.0	


OCCUPATI

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Computer Engineer	2	1.9	2.0	2.0
	Teacher	9	8.7	8.8	10.8
	House Wife	10	9.7	9.8	20.6
	Accountant	5	4.9	4.9	25.5
	Employee	1	1.0	1.0	26.5
	Director of Research Division	1	1.0	1.0	27.5
	Blumber/Painter	5	4.9	4.9	32.4
	Journalist	2	1.9	2.0	34.3
	Director	1	1.0	1.0	35.3
	Researcher	2	1.9	2.0	37.3
	TV Program Director	1	1.0	1.0	38.2
	Employee	8	7.8	7.8	46.1
	Gate Keeper	4	3.9	3.9	50.0
	Farmer/unskilled Labo	10	9.7	9.8	59.8
	Unemployed	8	7.8	7.8	67.6
	Lecturer	3	2.9	2.9	70.6
	Carpenter	1	1.0	1.0	71.6
	Pharmasist	4	3.9	3.9	75.5
	Waiter/Chef/Baker	7	6.8	6.9	82.4
	Lawyer	5	4.9	4.9	87.3
	Import/Export Special	1	1.0	1.0	88.2
	Student	2	1.9	2.0	90.2
	Salesman	1	1.0	1.0	91.2
	Driver	2	1.9	2.0	93.1
	Contractor	1	1.0	1.0	94.1
	Touristic Guide	1	1.0	1.0	95.1
	Street Vendor	1	1.0	1.0	96.1
	Nurse	1	1.0	1.0	97.1
	Data Entry Clerk	1	1.0	1.0	98.0
	Secretary	2	1.9	2.0	100.0
	Total	102	99.0	100.0	
Missing	99	1	1.0		
Total		103	100.0		


# Sex




# Age




# BIRTH PLACE




# MARRIAGE



# EDUCATION



# RELIGION



**Case Processing Summary**


	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Sex * Q8.1A	103	100.0%	0	.0%	103	100.0%
Sex * Q8.1B	18	17.5%	85	82.5%	103	100.0%
Sex * Q8.2A	103	100.0%	0	.0%	103	100.0%
Sex * Q8.2B	72	69.9%	31	30.1%	103	100.0%
Sex * Q8.3A	103	100.0%	0	.0%	103	100.0%
Sex * Q8.3B	14	13.6%	89	86.4%	103	100.0%
Sex * Q9	103	100.0%	0	.0%	103	100.0%
Sex * Q10.1	103	100.0%	0	.0%	103	100.0%
Sex * Q10.2	103	100.0%	0	.0%	103	100.0%
Sex * Q10.3	103	100.0%	0	.0%	103	100.0%
Sex * Q10.4	103	100.0%	0	.0%	103	100.0%
Sex * Q10.5	103	100.0%	0	.0%	103	100.0%
Sex * Q10	99	96.1%	4	3.9%	103	100.0%
Sex * Q11	103	100.0%	0	.0%	103	100.0%
Sex * Q12	103	100.0%	0	.0%	103	100.0%
Sex * Q13A	103	100.0%	0	.0%	103	100.0%
Sex * Q13B	20	19.4%	83	80.6%	103	100.0%
Sex * Q14	103	100.0%	0	.0%	103	100.0%
Sex * Q14A	78	75.7%	25	24.3%	103	100.0%
Sex * Q15	103	100.0%	0	.0%	103	100.0%
Sex * Q16	103	100.0%	0	.0%	103	100.0%
Sex * Q17	103	100.0%	0	.0%	103	100.0%
Sex * Q18	100	97.1%	3	2.9%	103	100.0%
Sex * Q19	103	100.0%	0	.0%	103	100.0%
Sex * Q19.1A	16	15.5%	87	84.5%	103	100.0%
Sex * Q19.1B	16	15.5%	87	84.5%	103	100.0%
Sex * Q19.2A	16	15.5%	87	84.5%	103	100.0%
Sex * Q19.2B	16	15.5%	87	84.5%	103	100.0%
Sex * Q19.3A	16	15.5%	87	84.5%	103	100.0%
Sex * Q19.3B	16	15.5%	87	84.5%	103	100.0%
Sex * Q19.4A	16	15.5%	87	84.5%	103	100.0%
Sex * Q19.4B	16	15.5%	87	84.5%	103	100.0%

**INFORMATION ABOUT COUNTRY OF DESTINATION:**

**8. Which of the following countries would you prefer to migrate to?**

Sex \* Q8.1B Crosstabulation


Count		Q8.1B				Total
		Holand	Italy	UK	France	
Sex	Male	3	1	8	1	13
	Female	1		3	1	5
Total		4	1	11	2	18



**Sex \* Q8.2B Crosstabulation**

Count


		Q8.2B								Total
		KSA	UAE	Kuwait	Oman	Jordan	Lebanon	Bahrain	Qatar	
Sex	Male	21	14	11	2	2	1	2	1	54
	Female	9	5	2	1	2	1	1	1	18
Total		30	19	13	3	2	1	3	1	72



**Sex \* Q8.3B Crosstabulation**

Count

		Q8.3B		Total
		USA	Australia	
Sex	Male	7	1	8
	Female	4	2	6
Total		11	3	14




**9. What is the principal reason for your preference?**

	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percent</b>	<b>Valid Percent</b>	<b>Cumulative Percent</b>
<b>Family ties</b>	16	15.5	15.5	15.5
<b>Language</b>	1	1.0	1.0	16.5
<b>A specific job offer</b>	13	12.6	12.6	29.1
<b>General job opportunities</b>	66	64.1	64.1	93.2
<b>Beauty of country</b>	1	1.0	1.0	94.2
<b>Company Husband/Wife</b>	1	1.0	1.0	95.1
<b>near to Egypt</b>	1	1.0	1.0	96.1
<b>Haj</b>	2	1.9	1.9	98.1
<b>Scientific Development</b>	1	1.0	1.0	99.0
<b>Study</b>	1	1.0	1.0	100.0
<b>Total</b>	103	100.0	100.0	

### 10. What have been your sources of information on your preferred country of destination?

Sex \* Q10 Crosstabulation


Count		Q10					Total
		friends/relatives	Egyptian authorities	embassies	Internet	General literature	
Sex	Male	46	3	1	9	12	71
	Female	21			3	4	28
Total		67	3	1	12	16	99



## 11. How do you plan to travel to you preferred country of destination?

Sex \* Q11 Crosstabulation


Count		Q11			Total
		boat	overland	flight	
Sex	Male	3	1	70	74
	Female	1		28	29
Total		4	1	98	103



**INFORMATION ON MOTIVATIONS TO MIGRATE:**

**12. Why would you go abroad (multiple answers possible)?**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Economic reasons (unemployment/low salaries)	68	66.0	66.0	66.0
Environmental reasons (crowd/pollution)	17	16.5	16.5	82.5
To company Husban/Wife	4	3.9	3.9	86.4
Easy life	2	1.9	1.9	88.3
Family Reasons	4	3.9	3.9	92.2
Many Egyptians are there in this country	1	1.0	1.0	93.2
Haj	3	2.9	2.9	96.1
Scientific development	2	1.9	1.9	98.1
Study	2	1.9	1.9	100.0
Total	103	100.0	100.0	




Q12

**13. Was there any special event or development that prompted your decision?**

**Sex \* Q13A Crosstabulation**

Count

		Q13A		Total
		Yes	No	
Sex	Male	13	61	74
	Female	7	22	29
Total		20	83	103



If Yes, please specify:

		going there for training before	An invitation to visit the country	Study Abroad before	Marriage from there	Husband is there	Announcing seconding teachers to Arab countries	Was there before	A friend went to this country	Family went to this country	Unemployment in Egypt	tot
<b>Sex</b>	<b>Male</b>	2	1	1	1		1	1	2	3	1	13
	<b>Female</b>					4				3		7
<b>Total</b>		2	1	1	1	4	1	1	2	6	1	20




# 14 Do you intend to return?

Sex \* Q14 Crosstabulation

Count


		Q14		Total
		Yes	No	
Sex	Male	59	15	74
	Female	21	8	29
Total		80	23	103



**If yes, under what conditions (multiple answers possible)?**

**Sex \* Q14A Crosstabulation**

Count		Q14A			Total
		Reasons to migrate disappeared	Earned enough money	Hopes did not materialise	
Sex	Male	5	50	4	59
	Female	6	13	4	19
	Total	11	63	4	78




**INFORMATION ABOUT WORKING ACTIVITY ABROAD:**

**15. Have you already been working abroad?**

Sex \* Q15 Crosstabulation


Count		Q15		Total
		Yes	No	
Sex	Male	24	50	74
	Female	4	25	29
Total		28	75	103



## 16. Can you go abroad without needed documents?

Sex \* Q16 Crosstabulation


Count		Q16		Total
		yes	no	
Sex	Male	4	70	74
	Female	3	26	29
Total		7	96	103



## 17. What do you expect from your working experience abroad?

Sex \* Q17 Crosstabulation

Count		Q17		Total
		To increase expertise and skills	To make a lot of money	
Sex	Male	17	57	74
	Female	10	19	29
Total		27	76	103



**18 In which of the following sectors will /would you be working abroad?**

	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percent</b>	<b>Valid Percent</b>	<b>Cumulative Percent</b>
Agriculture	3	2.9	3.0	3.0
Industry	14	13.6	14.0	17.0
Independent work	8	7.8	8.0	25.0
Home services	7	6.8	7.0	32.0
Building and constructions	6	5.8	6.0	38.0
Tourism and restaurants	9	8.7	9.0	47.0
Other services	40	38.8	40.0	87.0
I do not know	5	4.9	5.0	92.0
Computer Engineering	1	1.0	1.0	93.0
Education	5	4.9	5.0	98.0
Banking	1	1.0	1.0	99.0
Government Sector	1	1.0	1.0	100.0
Total	100	97.1	100.0	
99	2	1.9		
System	1	1.0		
Total	3	2.9		
	103	100.0		

### 19. Did anyone help you finding a job abroad?

Sex \* Q19 Crosstabulation

Count		Q19		Total
		Yes	No	
Sex	Male	11	63	74
	Female	5	24	29
Total		16	87	103

